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Abstract: In his paper, "Language, Vagueness, and Social Communication," Colin B. Grant adopts 
an interdisciplinary approach to an interrelated complex of language, communication, and society. 
Grant operates with a modified concept of vagueness as a pragmatic property and attempts to es-
tablish a link between pragmatic vagueness and contingency in communication. This communica-
tive contingency takes the form of improbabilities (entropy). Grant observes that the challenge lies 
in modelling communication as porous networks which nonetheless enable society to function. In 
this sense, contingency in communication must not be confused with arbitrariness just as cognitive 
closure cannot be confused with solipsism. This line of argumentation allows us to question and 
reassess conservative notions of dialogue or intersubjectivity in order to reveal the precariousness 
of social interaction processes. Cognitive autonomy, contingency in communication, and fictionality 
are then interrelated in an examination of the highly complex fictionalizations which enable these 
processes to take place. 
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Colin B. GRANT  
 
Language, Vagueness, and Social Communication  
 
The principal concern of this paper lies in the construction of a theory of social communication 
which acknowledges contingency on three levels: language, communication, and society. It oper-
ates with a logically loose definition of language vagueness and, in direct relation to this, with what 
radical constructivists call the cognitive autonomy of social actors. In an attempt to integrate the 
concepts of vagueness and cognitive closure at the communication level, I propose a theoretical 
model of "porous communication." I then relate the concept of porous communication to social 
communication by recognizing the improbability of social consensus as an ontological fact, truth or 
reality, but also the necessity of agreement as an operational mode of social interaction. Here, real 
epistemological gains can be achieved in operating with the fictionality or non-correspondence of 
such constructs of social interaction processes with what is held to be reality or objectivity. In oth-
er words, in this theoretical model of social communication based on cognitive closure and semiotic 
vagueness, the potential for pure solipsism is neutralized by a modeling of interaction processes as 
improbabilities which are reduced for purposes of social interaction by means of fictions. The no-
tion of the contingency of language immediately challenges an understanding of language as 
something non-contingent. Non-contingency can be taken for the purposes of my argumentation 
here to mean stability, determinacy, objectivity, or the idea -- to which many would subscribe at 
an intuitive level -- that language is an expression, reflection or concretization of something out-
side it. This "something outside language" is habitually given the name reality, objectivity, or even 
truth (see Schmidt, Kognitive Autonomie). Language is thus held to enter into a relation of corre-
spondence with reality. Moreover, it is held to correspond to a reality which is the common horizon 
of the acts of all (rational) social actors. And if it fails to correspond, society has a range of pathol-
ogies which can be used to exclude the offending speaker from normality: psychosis, autism, 
schizophrenia, for example. I wish to challenge such a view by relocating language in a much less 
stable -- and thus less epistemologically conservative -- context. The history of the philosophy of 
language has provided a variety of elements which can underpin a theory of the contingency of 
language, although many avenues have been left unexplored. Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of 
the sign is a case in point. In his Cours de linguistique générale (1923), the linguistic sign is con-
ceived as arbitrary. The term arbitrariness does not, however, mean autonomy; rather, it is the 
connection between signifier and signified that is held to be arbitrary in character. At the same 
time, the character of a sign is more often governed by rules and conventions which bring the ar-
bitrary sign back into the fold. In the present context it is highly significant that for Saussure the 
term arbitrary "should not suggest that the signifier depends on the free choice of the speaking 
subject" (Saussure 101; my emphasis).  
This notion -- that the arbitrariness of the sign does not induce the freedom of the speaking 
subject in language construction -- is supported by Saussure's view that the sign is historically 
rooted as an inheritance (in the pre-texts) of past epochs. Any arbitrariness is thus reigned in, as 
it were, by the collective psychology of the masse parlante (112). A contradiction thus emerges 
between individual language (parole) as an act of volition in which there is "nothing collective" and 
a conception of social language (langue) as a "sum of impressions deposited in each brain" (38). 
Although there is clear potential for a contingent model of the linguistic sign in the concept of arbi-
trariness on account of the tension between arbitrariness and language norm, this potential is not 
exploited. Saussure only succeeds in overcoming the radical consequences of semiotic arbitrari-
ness by means of a dubious appeal to collective psychology and a miraculous implantation of social 
language in the brain of each individual: "Language is not a function of the speaking subject, it is 
the product which the individual registers passively" (30). The concept of mass psychology may 
appeal to our intuitive vision of language as social interaction, but a more radical approach to arbi-
trariness is thereby foreclosed. The relation between free language construction and social orienta-
tion (see Schmidt, Kognitive Autonomie) can be modeled in other terms which recognize the au-
tonomy (a kind of radical arbitrariness) of the speaker as a social actor without recourse to a met-
aphysical psychologism born of a fear of anarchy. Further, W.V. Quine acknowledges in his Meth-
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ods of Logic the central status of contingency in language in starting from the productive hypothe-
sis that it is inaccurate to say that truth is a matter of correspondence to reality. Language is a 
case of "systematic ambiguity" (1) and the relation between utterance and reality "devious" (2). 
Quine nevertheless clings to the concepts of correspondence and world objectivity. Here, too, 
then, ambiguity is cushioned by the possibility of objectivity. The indeterminacy of our experience 
-- he contingency without which there can be no autonomy -- is offset by the fact that our state-
ments about reality are brought into a relation with experience as a corporate body and not as in-
dividual experience. How can this corporate body be reconciled with a radical concept of arbitrari-
ness?  
In his article, "Language Strata," Friedrich Waismann urges that "a speaker may, on the spur 
of a moment, place a word in a new collocation, thus giving rise to a new meaning -- a process 
over which there is little control" (12), appears to suggest a potentially more radical concept of the 
arbitrariness of meaning formation and the instability of context. However, rather than viewing 
arbitrariness as a generalized and inescapable linguistic fact, Waismann follows conventional wis-
dom in seeing poetry (in this case, that of Hugo von Hofmannsthal) as a privileged realm of the 
"multiplicity of meaning," "indefiniteness," and "strange suggestiveness": "Often, as we contem-
plate the word, we hesitate in our perceptive awareness between the particular reality which it 
symbolizes and a higher reality, and this in a flash leads up to the great and the sublime" (14). 
Thus, although Waismann is prepared to accept that meaning is difficult to control, and speakers 
are free to manipulate language, suggestive and polysemic literary language paradoxically points 
to a higher reality of eternal values -- a higher reality invoked as a deus ex machina to save the 
errant subject. The question remains as to whether this oscillation between particular and higher 
reality can be abstracted into the metaphysical concept of the sublime. There are clear contradic-
tions in Waismann's thoughts on language. If, for example, language possesses an "open texture" 
or "loosely knitted structure" as he argues, how then can that looseness be controlled? How can 
such looseness be made to make the quantum leap to a higher reality? How can Waismann, de-
spite these radical insights and questions, maintain a conservative attitude to the nature of the 
relation between language and reality in which first person utterances "are the points in which 
knowledge makes direct contact with reality" (25)? If our words are "blurred" (21), if it is impossi-
ble to say whether "this orange colour [is] precisely halfway between red and yellow," then we 
cannot know if a higher reality is being reached and our grasp of reality is irreducibly blurred, or 
vague. However, if Waismann's concepts are disabused of their metaphysical claims, his insights 
become clearer and much more radical. If all modes of expression in the history of man are seen 
as purely arbitrary, even the most precise definition contains an element of arbitrariness 
(Waismann, Introduction to Mathematical Thinking 166). His concept of arbitrariness can be made 
useful for a consideration of contingency at the communication (pragmatic and semiotic) level. If 
users of language use arbitrary language in a blurred way, then their communication, in which ar-
bitrariness is made even more contingent must somehow converge if society is to function. Not-
withstanding the prima facie, intuitive claim that there is an inherent contradiction between arbi-
trariness and convergence, Waismann's concept of convergent arbitrariness, laid out in his Intro-
duction to Mathematical Thinking, can be made useful in formal terms for a theory of social inter-
action based on the contingency of communication and the vagueness of its elements (languages). 
In other words, the myth that arbitrariness (or autonomy) and convergence (or society) are mutu-
ally exclusive can be debunked when we accept that the absence of one form of order logically 
conditions the emergence of another form of order. As George Spencer Brown argues, "It is a 
mathematical contradiction to say that a sequence has no pattern; at most, we can say that it 
does not display all those laws which one might look for. The concept of coincidence only makes 
sense in relation to an observer; whenever two observers look for different forms of pattern they 
must share an opinion as to what sequence is to be considered coincidental" (qtd. in Watzlawick 
69). Thus, just as arbitrariness or coincidence can be logically ordered, so, too, vagueness need 
not be seen as an atrophied form of an originally precise language. For example, declarations of 
love often elicit (the desired) confirmation that such sentiment is mutual. Whether that mutuality 
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is questioned is another issue; in fact, for the sake of the stability of a relationship, the mutuality 
is imputed as a (functional) fiction.  
Contingency -- in the form of arbitrariness or indeterminacy -- is a concept which replaces the 
relation with reality (allo-reference) with a relation with the self (self-reference). It can only be 
truly acknowledged with its cognitive and social implications if the contexts in which speech acts as 
socially codified language offers occur are seen as something altogether more variable and less 
stable than is often assumed. Arbitrariness need not imply anarchy, but might be seen as a specif-
ic pattern or form which can interact with another specific pattern by means of operational fictions 
in the process of communication. The gain to be made in adopting some conception of arbitrari-
ness derives from the abandonment of the "metaphysical adequacy of grammar" (in Max Black's 
sense of the term). If language, grammar and utterance are no longer seen in terms of corre-
spondence, "the conception of an 'ideal language,' perfectly conforming to the nature of reality, is 
a will o' the wisp that leads nowhere except into futility" (Black, The Labyrinth of Language 48-49 
). Thus language can be seen, in terms similar to those worked out by Waismann, as an "open 
system," disabused of correspondence pretensions, and "opening the door to mendacity" (Black, 
The Labyrinth of Language 48-49). It is Black who overcomes the negative view of vagueness as 
the "existence of objects concerning which it is intrinsically impossible to say either that the sym-
bol in question does, or does not, apply" (Black qtd. in Williamson, Vagueness 73; see also Keefe 
and Smith). The concept of vagueness is closely related to the lack of determination of language 
which is cognitively determined (by a similar lack of determination) and as such can be imported 
into social communication theory at an appropriately abstract level as porosity ("higher-order 
vagueness corresponds to contingency in which worlds are possible" (Williamson, "On the Struc-
ture of Higher-Order Vagueness" 128). The convergence of such absence of determination in lan-
guage and cognition is a necessary precondition for social construction and occurs at a communi-
cation/discourse level in operational fictions which preclude pure solipsism and stabilize vague-
ness.  
Vagueness is to language what porosity is to communication, meaning that boundaries -- both 
definitional and social-systemic -- remain inevitably porous; consider R.M. Sainsbury's remark that 
"almost all concepts lack boundaries" (252). Vagueness relates to language meaning -- semantics 
-- at a logical level of definition whereas porosity relates to language use at the pragmatic level of 
social communication. Porosity does not signify logical vagueness but the use of fuzzy signs for 
someone. If language is vague, then communication, based on language, is porous, or "infinitely 
iterable" (Derrida 61). Bertrand Russell argues that "in dealing with highly abstract matters it is 
much easier to grasp the symbols (usually words) than it is to grasp what they stand for" (61) and 
warns against the "fallacy of verbalism" in which things are conflated with their names. Verbalism 
can be avoided without recourse to metaphysics by establishing a link between fuzzy language and 
fuzzy signs, i.e. communication. Thus, Russell's view that vagueness is a "characteristic of its rela-
tion to that which is known, not a characteristic of the occurrence itself" (62) is insightful. This is 
the paradox of contingency: non-relation, non-correspondence, non-identity, non-equivalence, 
non-dialogue, non-intersubjectivity and non-interaction are relational concepts. In his 
Philosophische Grammatik, Wittgenstein defines grammar as a series of agreements in which 
meaning is constituted through relations and not effects. Any language rule, therefore, is not con-
structed according to an external telos, but follows the relational connections of the speakers: "Let 
us draw the analogy language -- table. The table does not demand that it always be used in the 
same way. It is crossed, like a field, by various paths. The entrance can be on any side. The route 
is different every time" (94; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are mine).  
In his defense of an epistemic concept of vagueness, Williamson dismisses the objection that 
the connection between use and meaning should be severed: "our use leaves not a line, but a 
smear" ("On the Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness" 273) and although it is impossible to define 
the distinction between the two, he upholds the distinction, arguing that "full understanding" is 
possible and that "to know what a word means is to be completely inducted into a practice that 
does in fact determine a complete intension" ("On the Structure of Higher-Order Vagueness" 276). 
It can be argued that such a logically idealized concept of meaning signifies little in terms of social 
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communication. Where meaning is conceived as a complete induction into practice, the inescapa-
ble vagueness of language is neutralized. Meaning is thus stabilized in a potentially static way at 
variance with the oscillations and negotiations of communication processes at a more pragmatic 
level of theoretical extension. Induction is in fact nothing more than an operational or functional 
fiction designed to stabilize proximate use of different speakers and if language is semiotically po-
rous, then communication is a contingent enterprise (see Grant, Functions and Fictions of Commu-
nication; "Discursive Democracy). It is this contingency, or improbability, which guarantees free-
dom in the form of what has been referred to in information theory as an entropic dynamic: "In 
the limiting case where one probability is unity (certainty) and all the others zero (impossibility), 
then H [information] is zero (no uncertainty at all -- no freedom of choice -- no information)" 
(Shannon and Weaver 15). Entropy is to be seen as a positive quality that asserts a language us-
er's autonomy. In other words, statement A will never be received as statement A by the receiver, 
isomorphism is impossible, metaphysical notions of dialogue can be rightly seen as chimerical, and 
the stability of the transmission model, binary dialogue and intersubjectivity can be overcome. In 
order to recapitulate, there is an interrelated progression from vagueness in language to autonomy 
in cognition to porosity in communication and operational fictions of society. Entropy -- the im-
probabilities in communication and maximization of information -- means that society builds on a 
socially constructive concept of vagueness in which logical purity recedes and communication 
comes to the fore. Society may, of course, impose constraints and keep entropy -- that is improb-
ability, or information gain -- to a minimum (see Luhmann, Macht). By dropping the onerous claim 
to correspondence or objectivity it is now possible to shift attention from correspondence and truth 
to difference and functionality. As we shall see, language users bring about a convergence in arbi-
trariness by operating with fictions in the wider sense -- i.e. socially functional constructions -- 
since, as Wittgenstein said, language, as a sign system, always appeals to a "live being" (192).  
Radical constructivist insights can be made useful in the context of a theory of the interweav-
ing of fiction and sociality because they problematize premises inherited by the human and social 
sciences from certain Enlightenment rationality theories (such as identity, intersubjectivity and 
correspondence or consensus) (for material of and about radical constructivism, see Riegler  
<http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism>). By placing emphasis on the inescapable contingency 
(entropy, cognitive autonomy) of knowing and perceiving, reality can be conceptualized as a con-
struction without recourse to static ontologies. Contingency of perception (close to the concepts of 
agonistics and morphogenesis as in Lyotard), which constructivists are at pains to see as socially 
functional, means the end of the knowability of objective realities as something external to man. A 
theory of porosity in social communication must go beyond the postmodernist jouissance of pure 
contingency for contingency's sake in the development of a theory of functional contingency. Ra-
ther than simply positing paralogy without rules, a constructivist theory of porosity should consider 
language contingency and, improbably, social communication in terms of the irreducible non-
correspondence of fuzzy signs -- be it with 'reality' or the worlds constructed by other speakers. 
Reality is perception-dependent, or, in cybernetic terms, observer-dependent and therefore con-
tingent. The dependency of observations, perceptions, and thus any reality constructions on the 
observer, is accompanied by certain radical corollaries set out by Ernst von Glasersfeld in his Dec-
laration to the American Society for Cybernetics delivered in 1983: "The epistemological implica-
tions of the concept of self-reference gain an even greater sphere of influence in the cybernetic 
approach to the philosophy of science. Here, there is a direct conflict with one of the basic dogmas 
of traditional science: the belief that scientific descriptions and explanations should or even can 
bring us closer to the structure of "objective" reality, to a reality which exists as such, inde-
pendently of any observer. Cybernetics, with its basic concepts of self-regulation, autonomy and 
the informally closed character of cognitive organisms, encourages a different perspective. From 
this perspective, reality is an interactive concept since the observer and the observed constitute a 
mutually dependent pair. …  Objectivity is the illusion of the subject that it is possible to observe 
without him. The invocation of objectivity is the abnegation of responsibility, hence its popularity" 
(Glasersfeld qtd. in Schmidt, "Modernisierung, Kontingenz, Medien" 12). While not retracting any-
thing about the fundamental self-regulation and self-reference of reality construction/perception, 
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Glasersfeld is careful to conceptualize autonomy in the realm of interactive social functionality. By 
means of operative fictions of collective knowledge, the (contingent) cognitive autonomy of social 
actors is communalized (in the sense proposed by Schmidt [e.g., "Media Societies"). Observer and 
observed form a mutually dependent pair; "reality" is interactive since self-regulation can only 
take place in an environment.  
In his approach to a metadisciplinary theory of knowing, Glasersfeld describes knowledge as 
being characterized by two distinct operations: action and result. His epistemology problematizes 
the Platonic dichotomy between knowledge (any cognitive operation means fictionalization) and 
being. This means that entities such as truth, reality and objectivity are no longer contemplated as 
static a priori-s, but as functionally necessary fictions which enable the interaction of cognitively 
autonomous actors. Operational fictions depend fundamentally on the viability of cognitive experi-
ence in which viability should be seen as an accommodation to the world which does not disturb 
our stability. Truth -- and history, reality and objectivity -- thus also becomes a relational concept 
and not an objective law. Having established a new epistemological premise about cognition and, 
as a consequence, reconceptualized communication in terms of improbabilities, the task is now to 
ask how contingency acts in a socially functional way. Peter Hejl's concept of synreferentiality -- 
similar to Husserl's "functional community of perception" (122) -- appears to offer a way out of the 
apparent aporias of pure autonomy and self-reference. It fulfils two functions: firstly, it acknowl-
edges the self-referential operations of communication and, implicitly, the cognitive closure of the 
"subject." Secondly, it also accepts the existence of a realm above cognitively closed actors. This 
realm, which is not metaphysical, but metacommunicational, is populated by self-referential com-
munications which can be accessed by actors as if they were a shared reality -- in a non-
ontological sense. This is where the media as synreferential generators play a key role: "Under-
standing can be theoretically modelled in terms of what communication attributes to or requires of 
cognition on the occasion of the processing of media offers, or in terms of what consciousness pre-
supposes as modus operandi of communicators during communication. Both communication and 
cognition cannot do without this imputation. In this respect understanding is something like a use-
ful fiction (in Vaihinger's use of the word): "We presuppose understanding in order to assume that 
communication is reasonable, because we assume that other people 'think'" (Schmidt, "The Myth 
of Autopoiesis" 322). This (fictionally) transcendent realm seems to take a step back from the 
brink of any "epistemological solipsism" in a way curiously reminiscent of Husserl's horizon of ex-
pectation. The gain is to be made in opening up inquiry to 'our' multiple fictions and their dramati-
zations in everyday life, in not painting the media, as specially mediatized forms of communica-
tion, as distortions of reality, but as differentiated fictions. In this case, the following conclusions 
can be reached: 1) vagueness is vague only in relation to the environment of the actor, 2) in cog-
nitive terms, non-correspondence translates into autonomy and self-reference, 3) in discourse or 
communication terms, vagueness and autonomy can be conceptualized as porosity, and 4) in so-
cial terms, language vagueness, cognitive autonomy and communicative porosity are articulated 
by operational fictions. Alternatively, as Glasersfeld argues, "The subjective element remains una-
voidable because the semantic link which connects acoustic images with meanings must be active-
ly constructed by each individual speaker" (219). Two basic factors can be held to account for the 
improbabilities in communication: communication takes place between social actors, that is, com-
municators, whose cognitive systems are closed. These communicators use languages which are 
vague. To achieve communication, let alone agreement or consensus, implies reaching a consen-
sus across cognitive closure and by means of languages which are used idiosyncratically by these 
cognitively closed actors. Correspondence, equivalence, intersubjectivity, and dialogue may be 
myths, and yet agreement is necessary. Thus, it can be said that commonality is fictional but in a 
cognitively enriched sense, i.e., functional.  
The foregoing must now be related to theories of communication at a social level. Here, any 
attempt to camouflage vagueness, cognitive closure and communicational porosity by recourse to 
an originary dialogue or intersubjectivity, must rely on metaphysics. Even Luckmann and Linell's 
attempt to introduce greater empirical plausibility into their dialogue concept (see Luckmann and 
Linell) amounts to a reluctance to acknowledge porosity in communication and closure in cognition. 
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Much more coherent and epistemologically daring is Luhmann's theory of asymmetry and related 
critique of the dialogical interaction paradigm, according to which inequality cannot be forced into 
a model of compatibility: "The semantic of interaction laid down in the eighteenth century is con-
cerned with a person-to-person relation. At the same time, it interprets itself as a model of socie-
ty" (Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 153). In fact, the interaction ideal of the Enlightenment is 
the self-interpretation of a small group of thinkers who idealized forms of direct interaction and 
social "reality." As Luhmann argues, the principle of reciprocity enshrined in the semantic of inter-
action is actually economically incompatible where "an understanding of interpersonally enriched 
reciprocity is no longer compatible with functional needs and forces the retreat of interaction theo-
ry into commonality" (Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 122). Luhmann thus sees the survival of 
theories of dialogism and intersubjectivity as a reflection of a consciousness of imperfec-
tion/perfectibility, based on the rationality paradigm, and which is not prepared to accept the con-
sequences of insights into cognitive self-reference. The reciprocal principle of interaction (and the 
confluence of social ideal and cognitive freedom it contains) finds its counterpart in the concept of 
the public sphere, not coincidentally introduced by Kant. The public sphere performs several key 
functions for Kant: it is a democratic realm in which rational practices communicate and contest 
power; and it is a meeting place for rational subjects who together form a public opinion. It can 
either be interpreted as a topography or guiding democratic principle, or, conversely, following 
Luhmann, as a (necessarily fictional) self-thematization of bourgeois society at this time. Given the 
porosity of communication (and this means polycontextuality as in Derrida and Luhmann), to de-
scribe the public sphere as a place is therefore to ignore its fictional status and to disregard the 
noise factor in communication (see Shannon and Weaver). With the eclipse of the universalistic 
discourses (of liberation, emancipation or reason), communication inevitably loses its transcendent 
horizon of reference. As a result, communication becomes "agonistic" in so far as communicative 
acts assume pragmatic-functional positions in a non-static communication process subject to noise 
which provokes instability. Transparency and stability yield to blind spots; identification (homolo-
gy) is replaced by difference, while legitimacy is to be gained not in a consensual discours, but in 
dissent (see Lyotard xxv, 61).  
Despite the empirical evidence of the ruptures and instabilities in communications, some (e.g., 
Habermas) continue to hold the view that rational lifeworld energies presuppose consensus, how-
ever improbable and infrequent this may actually be. In advancing this argument, Habermas does 
not, however, lose sight of countervailing tendencies outlined in various ways by Derrida, Lyotard, 
Foucault, and Luhmann. Whereas the lifeworld depends on the (presumed) rationality of 
intersubjective communicative reciprocity, the system depends on performativity and self-
referentiality. Systems logic does not completely colonize lifeworld energies. Attempts made by the 
system to interfere in lifeworld spheres such as cultural tradition, social integration or education, 
inevitably conflict with the communicative rationality of these spheres -- which have become dif-
ferentiated from other spheres in the process of specialization. A further differentiation can be not-
ed in the case of culture which, in achieving autonomy, has also become separated from the her-
meneutics of everyday life (this differentiation may also explain why Habermas neglects so con-
sistently so-called pathological forms of communication). More recently, he has also redoubled his 
criticisms of Adorno's negative aesthetics. Adorno had offered two perspectives on the role of art 
in society: either it can sustain the link between artistic autonomy and everyday practice, or art 
can become the negation of society and communication, retain its autonomy and lose its effective-
ness. Habermas insists that there is a connection between differentiated aesthetic communication 
and everyday practice which derives from the fact that the radicality of the artistic experience can 
be capable of compensating for the pauperization of everyday life wrought by the procedures of a 
system based on rationalization: "The negativity of art can be seen in the fact that it resists as-
similation into the habitual or pre-interpreted; but triviality can only be broken by a negativity 
which remains in contact with the lifeworld and releases forces for renewal in a communication 
threatened by entropy ("Replik" 552).  
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas elaborates a complex theory of social action 
which links social cohesion to communicative consensus. Cohesion and consensus coalesce to gen-
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erate a lifeworld which, although constantly under attack from the system, still offers an overarch-
ing horizon of references from which social actors derive their social bearings. Thus Habermas suc-
ceeds in uniting social actions and communicative practices: both are linked by rationality. On an 
epistemological level, therefore, Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action derives from a her-
meneutic of rationalism. But this hermeneutic is in itself insufficient to describe the core elements 
of social cohesion, speech acts. Since communicative speech acts are, by definition, rational for 
Habermas, the linguistic basis of his theory must be a form of universal pragmatics. Universal 
pragmatics seeks to reconstruct the ideal conditions of speech acts rooted in the inherent rationali-
ty of communicative action. The type "communicative action" is a non-parasitic type of action, a 
type distinct from jokes, irony, pathologies or fictions. Since these parasitic, or volatile forms of 
communication are filtered out of the type "communicative action," it follows that the latter must 
be characterized by stability and transparency and is threatened by what Habermas terms "entro-
py." Stability and transparency are inherent in the validity pretensions of a given communicative 
speech act (that it be true, authentic and correct), referred to as the illocutionary binding force of 
that act. It is at this stage clear that the notion of the norm can be seen to enact a crucial function 
in universal pragmatics. For this reason, the Habermasian concept of language games (which Witt-
genstein set out in the Philosophische Grammatik) is not based on paralogy but on homology and 
the quest for understanding: "Irrespective of the cultural background, all participants know intui-
tively too well that a consensus based on conviction is not possible without symmetrical relations 
between the participants in communication … relations of reciprocal recognition, the reciprocal as-
sumption of the stance of the other, reciprocal imputed willingness to see one's own traditions with 
the eyes of an outsider and to learn from each other, etc." (Habermas, Wahrheit und 
Rechtfertigung 332).  
Discourse norms are also central to the concept of discourse introduced by Michel Foucault in 
his The Order of Discourse. Of course, Foucault does not seek an immaculate language in the form 
of a universal formal pragmatics: discourses are temporally and spatially legitimated languages 
linked to power and accordingly ruled by procedures of exclusion. In this model of internal and ex-
ternal exclusion procedures (or norms), Foucault must also assume stability: discourse is ruled by 
prohibitions, oppositions, manicheisms and disciplines, commentaries and author-functions. Since 
he was not to conceive of volatile language until The History of Sexuality, Foucault must proceed 
from an ineluctable norm, defined by power. There is, in conclusion, little difference between 
Habermas and Foucault on the question of the norm. The difference lies in the conception of ra-
tionality: for Habermas rationality is an emancipatory force, for Foucault it is a disciplinary force. 
Both assume stability and offer apologetic treatment of counterfactual ideals or power complexes. 
There is thus no space for a dynamic theory of porosity in these stabilized models. Further, it is 
well known that Lyotard argued that Habermas's reduction of communicative interaction to the 
search for consensus "does violence to the heterogeneity of language games" (Lyotard xxv). While 
Lyotard is right in arguing that communication is far less immaculate than the theory of communi-
cative action suggests, his enshrinement of strategic games tends to ignore the possibility of 
"common knowledge" and the operations of the media in articulating this and similar fictions. The 
modification would reside in reconceptualizing the system as a much less stable phenomenon 
which is, in itself, contingent on communication.  
There might by now be a nagging doubt in the reader's mind that to see language and cogni-
tion as contingent and coupled only by fictions is to open the door to anarchy, solipsism, relativ-
ism, and social atomism. This need not be so. As we have seen, both Foucault and Habermas pro-
ceed from the principle that rational communication is organized and thus restricts entropy. 
Habermas attributes to rational lifeworld communicative practices the capacity for communicative 
renewal despite the threat of entropy. Entropy is seen here as the antinomy of rational inclusive 
communication and as something which can be avoided. However, entropy is an inherent charac-
teristic of any communication system since the removal of improbability would result in pure sta-
tistical regularity or redundancy and no information. Given the cognitive uniqueness (and that 
means freedom) of each actor, this is, to say the least, improbable. Any control must therefore 
take place at the cost of a reduction of the very freedom that entropy guarantees. Intuition dic-
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tates that our perceptions maintain a noise-free contact with external reality, enabling us to make 
copies of that reality. Perception, as an act of cognition, is however a self-referential process. Ger-
hard Roth defines it as a neurological process in a closed organ (the brain), in which direct contact 
with external reality is precluded. The environment of external "reality" merely transmits electrical 
impulses which are incapable of penetrating the brain. In neurological terms, data processing is 
independent of outside reality to the extent that the language of the nervous system is independ-
ent of "meaning" (see Roth; see also Schmidt, Kognitive Autonomie). Habermas's overarching so-
cial-theoretical aim is valid, but it is achieved by neglecting the fact that it is the "shuffledness" 
(Shannon and Weaver 12) of communication which offers the warranty for autonomy. One danger 
would lie in taking such shuffledness (or fictionality as a prime example of this) as an absolute and 
thereby failing to carry out the second step which recasts the examination of fictionality in terms 
of its (social) functionality. Entropy, as a guarantee of cognitive autonomy, is part of the factual 
dynamics of communication. It remains to be seen how this entropy can be brought into the fold 
as functional communication without denying freedom. Schmidt, in his Kognitive Autonomie und 
soziale Orientierung, is at pains not to disconnect cognitive autonomy from the social realm and 
refers to social orientation as the pragmatic ecology without which a cognitive system would be-
come involuted and dysfunctional. The equivalent of such an environment in communication theory 
could be the concept of context. The mutually dependent modi operandi of cognitive autonomy and 
social orientation mean that reality constructions on the cognitive level somehow interact with re-
ality constructions on the social level. In alternative terms, fictionality on a self-referential level 
interacts with fictionality on a hetero-referential level. In this way, fictions, characterized by entro-
py, contingency and autonomy, become functional in the communication of socially relevant codifi-
cations. According to Hejl, "a group of individuals who have a) elaborated the same reality con-
struction and, in addition, a group of actions attributed to this and b) who interact with reference 
to this reality construction" constitute a social system (191). However, any notion of identical re-
alities is implausible if the principle of cognitive autonomy is taken seriously. In place of identity, 
functional similarity -- and that means fictions -- would be a more appropriate term. The contin-
gency of our "life reality" (Glasersfeld) is not necessarily a synonym for alienation for there is ar-
guably a paradoxical community of contingency in the sense that all actors are equally susceptible 
to risk at a system level and thus contingency at a cognitive level. It could be argued that contin-
gency is a very important component of our shared experiences (see Habermas, Wahrheit und 
Rechtfertigung). A specific case reveals the extent to which systems are contingent upon commu-
nications (in their interactions with their environments) and contingent in communications (they 
are the only media available for such interactions). Given this double contingency of communica-
tion (see Grant, "Discursive Democracy"), the legal system, for example, is as susceptible to noise 
as any other agency that is dependent on communication. In this way, the legal system can be 
viewed as being provisionally closed in its operations but essentially porous (see Grant, Kritik der 
Dialogizität 5).  
The only way in which social actors can gain purchase over the legal system, or indeed any 
other, is by participation in essentially porous communication. This conceptualization has two ad-
vantages: it neither relies on the counterfactual normativity developed in Habermas (i.e., universal 
communicative rationality), nor on an excessively ontological concept of systemic closure as laid 
out by Luhmann. Instead, the concept of operational fictions seeks to remain sensitive to social 
and subjective construction and to heighten theoretical awareness of the precariousness of social 
orders. This potentially heightened awareness of the fictionality of social construction has the po-
tential to make us take subjective constructions more seriously, identify abuses of power, and 
wonder at the remarkably intricate interpersonal networks of social interaction.  
 
Note: This paper is a revised version of Colin B. Grant, "Vagueness, Porous Communication, Fictions of Society" 
in Language-Meaning-Social Construction: Interdisciplinary Studies. Ed. Colin B. Grant and D. McLaughlin. Am-
sterdam: Rodopi, 2001. 43-58.  
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